Alexandre Billon
2016-08-30 16:43:00 UTC
Dear all,
A few potential contributors have asked us for a small delay---september
1st is quite close to vacation time in many parts of the world. Considering
this, we have decided to postpone the deadline to September 8.
Best,
Alexandre
*CFP : Pathologies of self-awareness*
(Special Issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology)
Self-awareness is the kind of awareness of ourselves that underlies our
standard, first-personal attributions of conscious states and actions. It
displays various epistemic, semantic and psychological features that have
drawn the attention ofphilosophers at least since Descartes.
It is widely believed that self-awareness is impaired in patients suffering
from schizophrenia, and the study of such patients has been one of the most
important sources for the empirical study of self-awareness. However,
schizophrenic patients also suffer from deficits that may have nothing to
do with self-awareness and it is not clear that they constitute the best
probe for self-awareness. On the other hand, lesser studied conditions,
such as depersonalization, the Cotard syndrome, somatoparaphrenia, or even
split-brain, Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) and other âdissociativeâ
conditions seem to involve specific impairment of self-awareness and have
been widely neglected in the literature on the topic.
In recent years, neuroscientists have also designed new paradigms,
contrasting the treatment of self-related vs. non-self-related stimuli,
purported to study self-awareness in the healthy. Are these paradigms, the
study of schizophrenia, depersonalization, split-brain, Cotard syndrome
MPD, etc. equally legitimate ways to investigate self-awareness? Do they
converge? If so, what picture of self-awareness do they suggest? Or do they
target different kinds of self-awareness?
The purpose of this special issue is to unite philosophers, psychologists,
psychiatrists, and neuroscientists in order to further our
understanding of the disorders of self-awareness. We particularly welcome
submissions that seek to clarify or question the significance of various
disorders and experimental paradigms for the study of self-awareness or
that purport to disentangle the use ofâself-awarenessâ and the related
âsense of ownershipâ âsense of agencyâ âsense ofthe selfâ and
âself-consciousnessâ in the literature.
Potential issues to be addressed include but are not limited to:
⢠*The varieties of self-awarenesses and its disorders.* What are the
different kinds or facets of self-awareness? How are they related? In which
psychiatric conditions do they break down? What is the relationship between
disorders such as schizophrenia, depersonalization, the Cotard syndrome and
pain asymbolia?
⢠*Understanding specific disorders of self-awareness.* Can a better
understanding of self-awareness help us understand some puzzling
psychiatric conditions such as schizophrenia, split-brain, MPD, the Cotard
syndrome or depersonalization?
⢠*Probing self-awareness.* What are the best empirical probes
for self-awareness. Can the study of self-related processing really aid our
understanding of self-awareness? How do patients suffering from various
disorders of self-awareness process self-related stimuli? What is the
relationship between self-awareness and the âdefault modeâ neural network?
⢠*Lessons from psychopathology.* What can the
psychopathology of self-awareness teach us about the self, experiences and
actions, or the phenomenology, epistemology and psychosemantics of
self-attributions
?
*Guest Editors*
Alexandre Billon (Université de Lille Nord de France)
Francesca Garbarini (Università degli Studi di Torino)
*Invited Contributors*
José Luis Bermudez (Texas A&M University)
Philip Gerrans (University of Adelaide)
Daniele Romano (Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca)
*Schedule*
Submission Deadline: September 8, 2016
*How to submit*
Prospective authors should register at: <http://www.editorialmanager/>
http://www.editorialmanager. com/ropp to obtain a login and select
"Pathologies of Self-Awareness" as an article type.
Manuscripts should be approximately 8,000 words. Submissions should follow
the author guidelines available on the journal's website
http://www.springer.com/ philosophy/journal/13164.
*Contact*
For any queries, please email: <***@univ-lille3.fr>
***@univ-lille3.fr
--
Alexandre Billon
MCF Université Lille-III
STL (CNRS UMR 8163)
Responsable du Master MEEF de philosophie
Enseignant référent en licence de philosophie
https://univ-lille3.academia.edu/AlexandreBillon
GPG public key <http://alexandrebillon.perso.sfr.fr/crypto/publickey.asc>
Messages to the list are archived at http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/philos-l.html and at the unofficial mirror site http://blog.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.region.europe.
Recent posts can also be read in a Facebook group: https://www.facebook.com/PhilosL/.
Discussions should be moved to Chora (a list solely for members of Philos-L): enrol on Chora via http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/chora.html.
To join Philos-L email the single line "subscribe philos-l yourname" to ***@liv.ac.uk and read the welcome message carefully. To sign off the list send a blank message to philos-l-unsubscribe-***@liverpool.ac.uk.
A few potential contributors have asked us for a small delay---september
1st is quite close to vacation time in many parts of the world. Considering
this, we have decided to postpone the deadline to September 8.
Best,
Alexandre
*CFP : Pathologies of self-awareness*
(Special Issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology)
Self-awareness is the kind of awareness of ourselves that underlies our
standard, first-personal attributions of conscious states and actions. It
displays various epistemic, semantic and psychological features that have
drawn the attention ofphilosophers at least since Descartes.
It is widely believed that self-awareness is impaired in patients suffering
from schizophrenia, and the study of such patients has been one of the most
important sources for the empirical study of self-awareness. However,
schizophrenic patients also suffer from deficits that may have nothing to
do with self-awareness and it is not clear that they constitute the best
probe for self-awareness. On the other hand, lesser studied conditions,
such as depersonalization, the Cotard syndrome, somatoparaphrenia, or even
split-brain, Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) and other âdissociativeâ
conditions seem to involve specific impairment of self-awareness and have
been widely neglected in the literature on the topic.
In recent years, neuroscientists have also designed new paradigms,
contrasting the treatment of self-related vs. non-self-related stimuli,
purported to study self-awareness in the healthy. Are these paradigms, the
study of schizophrenia, depersonalization, split-brain, Cotard syndrome
MPD, etc. equally legitimate ways to investigate self-awareness? Do they
converge? If so, what picture of self-awareness do they suggest? Or do they
target different kinds of self-awareness?
The purpose of this special issue is to unite philosophers, psychologists,
psychiatrists, and neuroscientists in order to further our
understanding of the disorders of self-awareness. We particularly welcome
submissions that seek to clarify or question the significance of various
disorders and experimental paradigms for the study of self-awareness or
that purport to disentangle the use ofâself-awarenessâ and the related
âsense of ownershipâ âsense of agencyâ âsense ofthe selfâ and
âself-consciousnessâ in the literature.
Potential issues to be addressed include but are not limited to:
⢠*The varieties of self-awarenesses and its disorders.* What are the
different kinds or facets of self-awareness? How are they related? In which
psychiatric conditions do they break down? What is the relationship between
disorders such as schizophrenia, depersonalization, the Cotard syndrome and
pain asymbolia?
⢠*Understanding specific disorders of self-awareness.* Can a better
understanding of self-awareness help us understand some puzzling
psychiatric conditions such as schizophrenia, split-brain, MPD, the Cotard
syndrome or depersonalization?
⢠*Probing self-awareness.* What are the best empirical probes
for self-awareness. Can the study of self-related processing really aid our
understanding of self-awareness? How do patients suffering from various
disorders of self-awareness process self-related stimuli? What is the
relationship between self-awareness and the âdefault modeâ neural network?
⢠*Lessons from psychopathology.* What can the
psychopathology of self-awareness teach us about the self, experiences and
actions, or the phenomenology, epistemology and psychosemantics of
self-attributions
?
*Guest Editors*
Alexandre Billon (Université de Lille Nord de France)
Francesca Garbarini (Università degli Studi di Torino)
*Invited Contributors*
José Luis Bermudez (Texas A&M University)
Philip Gerrans (University of Adelaide)
Daniele Romano (Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca)
*Schedule*
Submission Deadline: September 8, 2016
*How to submit*
Prospective authors should register at: <http://www.editorialmanager/>
http://www.editorialmanager. com/ropp to obtain a login and select
"Pathologies of Self-Awareness" as an article type.
Manuscripts should be approximately 8,000 words. Submissions should follow
the author guidelines available on the journal's website
http://www.springer.com/ philosophy/journal/13164.
*Contact*
For any queries, please email: <***@univ-lille3.fr>
***@univ-lille3.fr
--
Alexandre Billon
MCF Université Lille-III
STL (CNRS UMR 8163)
Responsable du Master MEEF de philosophie
Enseignant référent en licence de philosophie
https://univ-lille3.academia.edu/AlexandreBillon
GPG public key <http://alexandrebillon.perso.sfr.fr/crypto/publickey.asc>
Messages to the list are archived at http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/philos-l.html and at the unofficial mirror site http://blog.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.region.europe.
Recent posts can also be read in a Facebook group: https://www.facebook.com/PhilosL/.
Discussions should be moved to Chora (a list solely for members of Philos-L): enrol on Chora via http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/chora.html.
To join Philos-L email the single line "subscribe philos-l yourname" to ***@liv.ac.uk and read the welcome message carefully. To sign off the list send a blank message to philos-l-unsubscribe-***@liverpool.ac.uk.